Baltic Sea NGO Forum 2005 in Gdynia / Poland - THE FINAL DECLARATION

The Baltic Sea NGO Network gathered to the V Baltic Sea NGO-Forum in Gdynia in Poland 12-13.5.2005 and brought together 190 civil society representatives from all the Baltic Sea countries.

The Forum is convinced that civil society is based on active public participation. We believe it strengthens citizens capacity to take part actively in democratic processes. Civil society facilitates public discussions and is a meeting place for people to define and formulate common interests in relation to the state, local authorities and the market forces. Civil society will have an increasing role to play in the region by enhancing peoples will to take part in their respective communities.

The Baltic Sea NGO network was established in Copenhagen 2001 and have since that developed cooperation for strengthening civil society in our common region. Forums in Lubeck, S:t Petersburg, Turku and Parnu have developed and stabilized the process and created networks in several fields. During the V Forum in Gdynia items like Baltic Sea state citizens – Third Sector contribution to Baltic Sea cooperation programs, EU financial policy and civil society development and Third Sector as a Bridge over Borders have been dealt with.
National platforms, thematic cooperation networks and other structures, like NGO-and information centers, of Baltic Sea region have been exchanging experiences in regional cross-border and cross-sector cooperation.

The Forum has with satisfaction noticed the report " The NGO Legislation in the countries in the Baltic Sea Region" by MP Mrs. Outi Ojala for the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference dealing with the situation of NGOs in different Baltic Sea countries.

Forum received reports and suggestions from four workshops:
Ecology and environmental protection,
Culture and education,
Human Rights and socially excluded groups,
Local and regional development.

The V NGO Forum agreed upon:

- the necessity of continuing the work of the Network based on the four previous Forum recommendations, with a view to further create closer contacts with the governments and increase information exchange.
- supporting the main suggestions expressed in the report " The NGO Legislation in the countries in the Baltic Sea Region", especially the need to create, in mutual cooperation, suitable infrastructure for NGOs and guarantee financial assistance and support systems for civil society development as a means of enhancing democracy
- readiness to cooperate with Council of Baltic Sea States and its working bodies, Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, Nordic Council of Ministers, Nordic Council and other public institutions in Europe and the Baltic Sea Region,
- to continue the efforts in gaining Special Participants Status in CBSS- Council of the Baltic Sea States,
- the importance of finalizing the work to increase cooperation with EU through INTERREG and other programs.

CHERNOBYL LESSONS FORGOTTEN?

April 26, 2005: 19 years have passed since the day of the catastrophe at Chernobyl NPP. The economic damage from it was three times larger than the economic benefit from the operation of all NPPs of the Soviet Union during 1954 - 1990. The radioactive fallouts of Chernobyl have been registered in 22 countries of Europe, America and Asia. Hundreds of thousands people had to move from the contaminated territories. Tens of thousands were killed by diseases caused by the Chernobyl contamination.

Have the Chernobyl lessons been learned in the Northwest Russia?

FORGOTTEN CHERNOBYL LESSON 1 –

JUST LIKE BEFORE CHERNOBYL, THE LAWS AND REGULATIONS ENSURING SAFE OPERATION OF NPPS ARE VIOLATED:
In Sosnovy Bor, 80 km West of St. Petersburg, the following potentially hazardous projects are implemented illegally (without the state environmental examination (EIA), without alternative options, without public participation, which are prescribed by the RF legislation):

Spent nuclear fuel assemblies (SNF) are stored twice denser than they should in the temporary "wet" storage facility of Leningrad NPP. About 4000 t of the fuel assemblies (equals to 50 "Chernobyls") are kept in the overcrowded building 90 meters from the shore of the Baltic Sea.
In 2004 the service time of the world-oldest LNPP power unit was extended by 15 years. The 30-year design lifetime of this Chernobyl-type reactor has expired. In July 2005 another similar reactor, which reached the design lifetime limit, will be shut down. Likewise, ROSENERGOATOM is intending to extend its lifetime without the state environmental examination and participation of those who take a risk of living next-door to this nuclear facility. These are the direct violations of Russian legislation.

The construction of a "dry" storage of SNF produced by LNPP is completed (illegally, without the state examination and public participation). It is also located near the Baltic shore. It is planned to store the spent fuel in metal-concrete containers following the new "dry" technology.
90 meters from the Baltic Sea the construction of a unit for cutting SNF of LNPP is close to completion. There exists a real hazard of Baltic ecosystems’ contamination with extremely toxic plutonium from more than 30.000 spent assemblies, which will be cut when transferred from the wet storage to dry metal-concrete containers.

The largest in Europe plant for melting the contaminated metal, ECOMET-S, operates on the territory of LNPP, it takes radioactive scrap metal from different regions of Russia. The ECOMET-S reconstruction is planned in order to accept radioactive metal from the decommissioned submarines of the Russian Northern Fleet. The shipment of radioactive metal from Germany is discussed. By this the Baltic shore starts to be used as the radioactive dump for Russia. It can become the all-European dump too.

Funding of the project for building a new NPP has been started illegally, without the state environmental examination and public participation. The planned NPP will have a new VVER-1500 reactor; its capacity will be 1500 MW. The project completion is planned for 2013, and site for a new NPP will be either on the territory of natural reserve Kotelsky, 50 km from Estonia, or near the LNPP.

The seabed power transmission line is designed for the export of nuclear electricity from LNPP to Finland. Such export of energy generated by one LNPP unit equals to the annual import of several tons of highly toxic waste containing Pu-239 from Finland. It is a threat to all living on the Baltic coast, and its impact may last dozens of millenniums. A reliable long-term isolation for this nuclear waste has not been found. That will have to be paid for by the future generations.

FORGOTTEN CHERNOBYL LESSON 2. THE INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING IS NOT PROVIDED; THE SOCIETY HAS NO POSSIBILUITY TO INFLUENCE THE USE OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES, JUST LIKE DURING the time of CHERNOBYL NPP OPERATION:

The regional ecological laboratory was closed in 2003, for almost 30 years it had provided the independent radiological and ecological monitoring data on the situation around Leningrad NPP. The long-term programs for the habitat and environment monitoring were terminated. The possibility of having independent data on the environment quality and to forecast its changes has disappeared. Such questions as ‘why the seeds and needles of pine trees growing near LNPP and in Sosnovy Bor have three times higher occurrence of genetic malformations’ asked by the environmentalists has been left without answer. This signal of ecological ill-being has not been heard.

The NEWSLETTER of LNPP (Vestnik LAES) newspaper was closed in autumn of 2004, it had been a periodical published for 7000 employees of LNPP and for the citizens of nuclear town. The newspaper covered the social issues and LNPP safety. "By this even the small fraction of truth, which we managed to publish and which excited negative reaction of the plant "elite", won’t be available for the public anymore. LNPP has become an informationally-closed community» - comment on the newspaper closure made by its former editor-in-chief, LNPP employees, Igor Kiselev (14.09.2004).

The Public council under the Minatom of Russia was disbanded in 2005; it provided a platform for discussions of relevant atomic engineering safety issues between the public and nuclear experts. At this the representatives of the public were accused of the espionage, the allegations were not supported by any proofs.

The documents on the scale and consequences of previous accidents at LNPP and other nuclear facilities of Sosnovy Bor continue to be classified. Because of this the lessons of the made mistakes are not learned and similar events may occur again.

FORGOTTEN CHERNOBYL LESSON 3: FROM 2000 THE MEASURES OF STATE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE LIVING ON THE TERRITORIES NEAR NPPs ARE NOT taken

ROSENERGOATOM has stopped the planning of emergency protection measures for the residents of 30-km zone around LNPP. In particular, the people are not provided with potassium iodide tablets, as prescribed by the Russian legislation. In case of a radiological disaster the timely iodine prophylaxis can reduce the risk of thyroid cancer by one order. Therefore, hundreds of thousands of the citizens of Russia living in the vicinity of NPPs are the potential victims of cancer.

Most inhabitants of the atomic neighborhoods of Russia have no access to radiation shelters, as they should in accordance with the regulations; in the atomic town Sosnovy Bor the availability of such shelters is 25 % from the norm.
Majority of inhabitants living in the 30-km zone around NPPs have no usable gas masks for personal protection in case of radioactive emergency. This also contradicts the valid regulations.
Plans for the evacuation of population in case of a radiological accident have not been updated since the time of the USSR, they are obsolete.

The governmental bodies – Agency for the Ecological, Technological and Atomic Supervision (former Gosatomnadzor – Sate Nuclear Regulatory Body), Ministry of Emergency Situations, Public Prosecutor and local authorities are funded by the tax-payers, at the same time they do not take measures to ensure their safety, do not provide compliance with the Constitution and RF legislation.

The state policy for supporting the development of nuclear technologies, which disregards the market mechanisms and violates the democratic mechanisms of public participation, brings Russia to new "chernobyls".

Being aware of this hazard the active citizens of Northwest Russia have united for the promotion of the ideas about the inevitable and gradual decommissioning of old and most dangerous nuclear reactors and about most effective use of energy efficiency potential (the available unused reserve is 40%) and sources of renewable energy (wind, sun, bio-fuel and geothermal energy).

In accordance with public opinion, steps in this direction should be made taking into account social, ecological and economic safety, and they should provide the basis for sustainable and balanced development of Russia and the whole Baltic and Barents Sea regions.

Additional information can be found on the site http://www.decomatom.org.ru/ , you can get it by the telephone and fax in Sosnovy Bor (81369) 72991

Oleg Bodrov, Alexey Yablokov, Alexander Nikitin, Grigory Pas’ko
Chairman of the Corr. Member of the RAS, Chairman of the Board, Chief Editor, Magazine
GREEN WORLD, President, CENTER Ecological and Civil ECOLOGY and LAW
International Socio- of ECOLOGICAL Rights Center BELLONA Moscow
Ecological Union POLICY of Russia St. Petersburg
Sosnovy Bor, SPb. Moscow

Nordic Council discusses Environmental Problems of Baltic Region in Pärnu

27.4.05
Contribution of NGO Green World, St.Peterburg
Unsustainable development of North-West Russia

Introduction to the problems:
(Material given as input for Meeting of NORDIC COUNCIL, April 27th 2005 in Pärnu, Estonia)
Russian state and Russian society has lost effective control over the development of nuclear complex in the North-West of Russia.
Mass violations of the Constitution and laws of the Russian Federation take place. At the same time, the state regulatory bodies do not perform their functions on securing environmental safety. Attempts of the public to influence this situation are blocked or ignored.
The Federal Energy Commission of Russia made not legal decision December 26, 2003, No.110-E/11 about the financing in 2004-2005 the reconstruction of the old nuclear units and lifetime extension of the dangerous (first generation) reactors, and designing of the new generation of the NPP with the reactor VVER-1500. All this actions started without the Environmental Impact Assessment and the State Environmental Examinations.
The international infrastructure for shipment of nuclear and radioactive waste to Russia through the Baltic Sea ports has started to be formed: The government of Russia has announced [Decree # 1491-r, October 14, 2003] that the ports of Baltiysk (Kaliningrad), Ust-Luga and Vysotsk (Leningrad Oblast) have the status of ports suitable for the transshipment of nuclear and radioactive materials.
Deputies of the upper and lower chambers of the Russian parliament, which were elected from the constituencies of the South Coast of the Gulf of Finland, represent the interests of nuclear and port business. E.g. deputy Yuzhilin voted for the amendments to Russian legislation, which would permit import of spent nuclear fuel from Western nuclear power plants.
In this way, the political and business structure has been established, which is interested in the promotion of projects for the import of nuclear and radioactive waste to Russia.
Facts and processes, which necessitate public participation in order to promote sustainable development (SD) and preserve natural, historical and cultural, values of the North-West Russia as a part of the Baltic and Barents regions (BBR).

1. lifetime extension of the old nuclear reactors on Leningrad NPP (LNPP) beyond they design limit without the state environmental examination, public participation and consideration of feasible alternatives.
There are serious problems in ensuring safe operation of LNPP and safe management (long-term storage or disposal) of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, which have accumulated during 30 years of the plant operation.
In accordance with Russian legislation, the lifetime extension of old reactors requires the state environmental examination of the Project for a power unit lifetime extension. The procedure of such examination foresees the consideration of solutions alternative to the lifetime extension, and the projects for safe disposal of spent nuclear fuel, evaluation of the social acceptability of the NPP operation for the health of people and environment. It is necessary to establish mechanisms for the participation of stakeholder groups in the decision making about the future fate of NPPs in the North-West Russia as the part of BBR.
October 4, 2004: Andrey Malishev, Head of Federal Service for Environmental, Technical and Nuclear Control (former Gosatomnadzor), signed a license for further operation of the first unit (oldest existing RBMK-1000 reactor) of Leningrad NPP. This was done in violation of the Russian Constitution, without the state environmental examination, which is prescribed by the appropriate Act on State Environmental Examination, and with complete neglect of the procedure for issuing such licenses.
The concern RosEnergoAtom began the exploitation of the oldest and dangerous LNPP reactor October 7, 2004, but it was twice stopped during 2 month by the systems of the automatically safety control.
Rosenergoatom used the same strategy for the lifetime extension of the first generation of the old reactor VVER 440/230 in Kola NPP.
July 2005 the second unit of the first generation ‘Chernobyl-type’ reactor of Leningrad NPP (LNPP) will reach design limit. ROSENERGOATOM have planned to prolong the operation of this unit on 15 years too.
The lifetime extension of the old reactor on LNPP where undertaken after the "safety audit" by private company. There was no any public or local authority participation in decision-making process.
The participation of citizens of Russia and neighbors countries, who will be exposed to the impact from Leningrad NPP, which is regulated by the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, has not been arranged.
The electricity consumers, in fact, paid for this audit of old power units. The license will be valid for a limited period of time, after which the licensing procedure will be repeated. The same schema for lifetime extension of the old reactors will continue in 2005 for the second unit of LNPP.
Therefore, this strategic decisions important for the BBR will follow the scheme of business partnership between the State Agency for Ecological, Technological and Atomic Service and Concern RosEnergoAtom. At this both partners are economically interested in the lifetime extension of old reactors, and the society is forced to pay for this expensive process without having an opportunity to influence it.
The mechanisms for the support of lifetime extension of old NPP power units:
Tariffs for the sold electricity (now about 40% of the tariff is the investment component). And the investors (consumers of electric power) have no possibility to influence the energy policy.
Establishment of new power-intensive and environmentally-hazardous facilities like an aluminium plant or new plant for the melting scrub metal near Leningrad NPP.
The installation of the infrastructure for the export of the nuclear electricity from Leningrad NPP to Finland. The electrical cable (150 km via the bottom of the Baltic Sea) from the Russian village Kernovo (2 km to the west form Leningrad NPP) to Kotka (Finland) began to designing Russian Finnish company BaltEnergo with Siemens support. The project cost $200.000.
Closeness of the territory near Leningrad NPP and actual lack of possibilities for developing alternative business, not related to the development of nuclear (radiation) technologies, leaves only one option for the social development - lifetime extension of old reactors or building new ones. The atomic industry money makes up more than half of the budget of the nuclear city Sosnovy Bor (65.000 residents).
International programs for providing equipment to improve the LNPP safety do not improve the plant personnel safety culture, but are used by Rosenergoatom to create the "LNPP safety scenery" and justify the option of lifetime extension for old reactors. This happens in the conditions, when there is no real mechanism of public participation during the implementation of those projects. There are examples proving that the means of Western partners are used inefficiently and do not result in actual increase of safety level. It is necessary to create mechanisms of public participation involving Russian and non-Russian NGOs from the countries, which render help to the old reactors.
Obstacles to public participation:
Lack of socially-oriented analysis of lifetime extension necessity, possible alternative scenarios and mechanisms of public participation on the local and regional levels;
Closeness of the territories around NPPs for the free flow of information, social apathy of the inhabitants of the region, lack of financial resources for public participation (in the form of Public Alternative Environmental Examination) on the municipal level and on the level of the subject of the Russian federation.
Absence of a possibility for the consumers of electric power to choose energy suppliers using market mechanisms and to have an opportunity for real influence on the decision about the power industry development strategy.
The absence of the joint actions experience of the Russian, Finnish, Sweden, Norwegian and Estonian NGOs and to use Russian Federal Act "On environmental examination” of November 23, 1995 ? 174-FZ, Article 11, ”… application materials for licenses permitting the activities, which may produce an impact on the environment are subjected to the mandatory environmental examination of the federal level" (which fully applies to the activities, which are referred to as "Leningrad NPP operation") … «feasibility studies and project proposals for economic activities, which may cause environmental impact in neighboring countries, or the implementation of which will entail the use of natural resources shared by neighboring countries, or which affects the interests of neighboring countries defined in the "Convention on the environmental impact assessment in the trans-boundary context" (Espoo-Convention). This fully applies to the project on the LNPP power unit modernization. Its operation extended beyond the design lifetime will mean the continued use of dozens cubic meters of the Baltic Sea water per second for the power unit cooling. And the Baltic Sea is the natural water body shared by 9 countries of the Region.

The attempts to extend the lifetime of old reactors are taking place in the conditions, when for 30 years of their existence the problem of final disposal of spent fuel from the RBMK-1000 reactors has not been solved. Leningrad NPP keeps 4 000 t of spent nuclear fuel, the amount equivalent to 50 Chernobyls, in a temporary storage 90 m from the Baltic Sea.
According the estimation of the experts the potential energy saving in NW Russia is about 40%. It is equivalent of the total energy production of Leningrad and Kola NPPs.
The potential renewable energy production in NW Russia more than nuclear energy production in this region.

2. New harbor installations in the Eastern Gulf of Finland
Primorsk (north coast of the Gilf of Finland).
The oil transition continues in usual way. 42 million tones of oil were exported from Primorsk harbor in 2004.
Vysotsk(north coast of the Gilf of Finland).
Last year the new oil terminal (2.5 million tons a year) started in operation in Vysotsk port. Full designed oil turnover will be as much as 10.7 million tons a year.
Now a perspective plan of extention of the coal terminals in this harbor was declared. The year turnover of coal terminal will be as much as 10 million tons by 2008-2010.
The reconstruction of Vysotsk port is accompanied by bottom drugging to provive the access of big vessels (by 35 thousand tons deadweight) to the harbor.
Ust-Luga (south shore of the Gulf of Finland).
Now only coal terminal is operating. New ferry (Russia-Germany) and container terminal and port infrastructure are under construction.
Vistino – Logi (south shore of the Gulf of Finland).
On April, 28, 2005 Inter-departmental Commission for distribution of productive enterprises in Leningrad oblast (Government of Leningrad oblast) agreed to realise several investment projects, both national and international, including construction of new terminals and port infrastructure in "industrial site Gorki" (see the table below).
Among the investors both Russian and international companies present. For example "TNK-BP" (Tumen Oil Company & British Petroleum) – Russian-British joint company "Oiltanking GmbH" – German company.
According the project "site Gorki" is planned for oil, coal and liquid gas transportation. Also it is planned to construct a "Gas liquefaction plant" near Gorki Village. Gas supplies will be provided to the plant from the new 40 km branch gas pipeline Falileyevo - Gorki.
The "industrial site Gorki" is situated at the east coast of the Luga Bay near rural settlements Vistino, Logi and Gorki.
Now this region is famous for its sustainable fishery and low economical activities in comparison with east corner of the Gulf of Finland. Only one little fish processing plant in Vistino produces now canned fish, smoked sprats, herring, etc. using local fish catches from the Luga Bay and the Gulf of Finland.

Planned terminals and freight turnover in the port site "Gorki" (million tons a year)
terminals
Load character__________________________/_1st stage_/_Perspective turnover
"TNK-BP" Oil & oil products________________/_10_______/_18
Coal coal_______________________________/_10_______/_12
"North-west Alliance" Oil & oil products______/_10_______/_18
"Luga-Oil" Oil & oil products________________/_3,5______/_10
"Oiltanking-Vistino" Oil & oil products________/_7,5______/_7,5
"Gasprom" Liquid gas______________________/_10______/_15
"SG-trans" Oil gas_________________________/_1,2______/_1,2
Others Different cargoes___________________/_25_______/_25
Total___________________________________/_77,2______/_106,7

Consequences.
Most part of the Luga Bay is a shallow bottom area. Deep grounds present only along the easten shore of the bay. Two new port areas, Ust-Luga port area and industrial site Gorki, are situated in short distance each other. The international Ramsar Wetland Site "Kurgalsky Peninsula" is as far as 7 km from Ust-Luga terminals. Thousands swans and other migrating birds are under threat of possible oil spills and other contaminations!
Also the intensive exploitation of the Luga Bay and the coast area will destroy fish spawning sites and hinder salmon migration in Luga River and sea area.
The hard anthropogenic intervention will promote dramatic changes in the traditional life style of Russian and Finnish (Izhora) population in this area.
Another international Ramsar Wetland Site "Beryozovy Islands" and herring spawning grounds in the Gulf of Vyborg near the port area Primorsk-Vysotsk area are threaten from tanker navigation.

More information
www.greenworld.org.ru
www.decomatom.org.ru
Oleg Bodrov, Vladimir Zimin,
NGO GREEN WORLD Chairman, NGO Green World Council member
Bodrov@sbor.net zimin@sbor.net

Russia blocks new environmental guidelines in Baltic Sea Region

COALITION CLEAN BALTIC (CCB) - Press release

Russia blocks new guidelines on requirements for Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) for harmful installations in the Baltic Sea Region,
at the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) meeting 1-2 March 2005.
CCB requests HELCOM to assess the problem of Industrial hog rearing farms in the Baltic Sea Region.

HELCOM adopted a recommendation in 1996, with requirements for EIAs for new harmful installations, to inform HELCOM and neighbouring countries, when planning for such new installations. Such information would give neighbouring countries a chance to comment and influence on restrictions for new installations with a transboundry environmental impact on the Baltic Sea environment.

Because of unclear interpretation of this recommendation, HELCOM has
developed draft guidelines on how to conduct an EIA procedure in a harmonized way, to be adopted by HELCOM 1 March 2005. This would give more precise requirements for information to be presented to HELCOM countries, when a new potential harmful intstallation, e.g. oil-terminals, oil extraction etc, is planned for.
HELCOM has for more than one year tried to develop new guidelines, but Russia stemmed the attempt at the HELCOM meeting. New guidelines will be postponed, at least until the next HELCOM Heads of Delegation meeting in June 2005.

The reason for such Russian position to delay the decision might be to avoid any environmental transboundary considerations with planned new oil-terminals and harbours in the Russian part of Gulf of Finland and Kaliningrad region the coming years.

CCB asked HELCOM to convey an assessment in all Baltic Sea region countries to get a clear picture on the environmental conditions at all small- and medium-sized (<> 2000 pigs) animal farms. Such industrial farms contribute considerably to the nutrient run-off and eutrophication of the Baltic Sea.
The CCB member organisation, Green Federation Gaja in Poland, has performed a study on environmental conditions at industrial pig farms in Poland, especially related to the implementation of the EU directive on integrated pollution prevention and control (IPPC) for industrial farms, and the EU Nitrate Directive. (Download the study, "Progress Report - Agricultural Pollution from Industrial Hog Rearing Farms in Poland")

The outcome of the study shows a bad implementation of the IPPC directive in Poland. Less than 50 % of the farms have applied for integrated permits and “fertilization plans” are missing for manure handling for many industrial farms.
-“The situation in Poland is disastrous. Most industrial pig rearing farms should be closed down immediately. They are operating only because regional environmental inspections tolerate this state and are still waiting for farms to adopt to the new regulations” - says Anna Roggenbuck, Green Federation Gaja

HELCOM accepted CCB's proposal and decided also to assess the implementation of existing regulations with regard to large scale animal farms in all Baltic Sea Region countries, and investigate the possibilities and need to develop BAT (Best Available Technology) description for smaller animal farms, not covered by the IPPC directive.

For more information contact:
Gunnar Norén, CCB Executive secretary,
phone +46-18-71 11 70, mobile +46-70-560 53 52; gunnar.noren@ccb.se

HELCOM announces Action Plan for Baltic Sea

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Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM)
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PRESS RELEASE:
HELCOM to develop Action Plan for the Baltic Sea

Dispatched March 3, 2005; for Immediate release

Helsinki, 3 March (HELCOM) – The Chair of the Helsinki Commission, Mr Arturas Daubaras announced today that HELCOM will begin to develop an Action Plan based on Ecological Quality Objectives in order to achieve a healthy Baltic Sea. This decision was unanimously adopted by representatives of all the Baltic Sea countries at the 26th annual Meeting of the Helsinki Commission, which took place 1-2 March in Helsinki, Finland. The draft European Marine Strategy, now being elaborated by the EU, foresees a separate action plan for each of the European seas. “HELCOM from now on will take the lead and play a key role, involving all stakeholders, in the development of the regional plan for the Baltic,” said Arturas Daubaras.

It was decided that the ongoing HELCOM work to develop Ecological Quality Objectives for the Baltic will provide the foundation for such an Action Plan. The Ecological Quality and associated indicators will be used to evaluate the efficiency of the existing environmental measures and to guide the future management measures for the region.

The Meeting adopted three new Recommendations on measures to prevent pollution in the Baltic Sea area.
The Recommendation on monitoring radioactive substance has been designed to support further efforts to protect the Baltic Sea against the possible harmful effects of radioactive substances by facilitating the compilation of reliable data on radionuclides in the different compartments of the marine environment.
The Recommendation on waterborne pollution load will require HELCOM countries to collect more reliable assessments of the waterborne loads of pollutants entering the Baltic Sea from land-based sources in order to facilitate concerted action to limit the pollution of the marine environment.
The third adopted Recommendation extends, as of 1 January 2006, the so called "no-special-fee" system, which has so far only covered oily wastes from machinery spaces, to also encompass garbage and sewage generated on ships. The no-special-fee system has the dual purpose of encouraging ships to dispose of their waste ashore instead of into the sea, while also encouraging that the waste burden is suitably shared, thus avoiding undesirable waste streams between ports. Such measures are vital in the implementation of the Baltic Strategy, which aims to substantially reduce the number of operational and illegal polluting discharges at sea.

One of the most important discussions at the Meeting focused on ways to enhance cooperation and coordination between the Helsinki Commission and the EU in order to ensure that hazardous substances threatening the Baltic Sea environment are adequately addressed at appropriate level. Representatives of the coastal countries discussed proposals for drawing the attention of the European Community to issues of specific concern to the Baltic Sea, such as dioxins. In addition, the Meeting emphasized the need to scrutinize whether proposed EU measures fully cover the needs of the unique Baltic Sea or if more specific hand-tailored HELCOM measures are required.

Representatives of the Baltic Sea States also discussed further measures to reduce airborne nitrogen based on a report identifying sources and assessing the adequacy of requirements for these particular sources of airborne nitrogen. About a quarter of the total nitrogen input to the Baltic Sea is coming from airborne nitrogen deposited directly on the Baltic Sea. As a significant share of the pollution entering the Baltic Sea originates in non-Contracting Parties, the Meeting also emphasized the importance of enhancing cooperation with Belarus, Ukraine and the Czech Republic.

The Helsinki Commission, or HELCOM, works to protect the marine environment of the Baltic Sea from all sources of pollution through intergovernmental co-operation between the countries bordering the sea - Denmark, Estonia, the European Community, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Sweden.
HELCOM is the governing body of the "Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area," more usually known as the Helsinki Convention.

For more information, please contact:

Nikolay Vlasov
Information Secretary
HELCOM
Tel.: +358 (0) 9 62 20 2235
Mobile: +358 (0) 50 56 34 932
Fax: +358 9 6220 2239
E-mail: nikolay.vlasov@helcom.fi
(Information source: Environmental Network "Coalition Clean Baltic" CCB, Östra ?gatan 53, SE-753 22 UPPSALA, SwedenPhone: +46 18 71 11 55Fax: +46 18 71 11 75 www.ccb.se)

Pressure on russian scientists - Additional information

To: whom it may concern
Topic: Pressure to Russian scientists
February 8, 2005
Sosnovy Bor, Moscow, St. Petersburg, Russia

Open message from Russian NGOs,

Dears Ladies and Gentlemen,

We have written about our disturbances because of contacts of the Green Europarliament with director of Sociological Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences A. V. Tikhonov in our previous letters.
He was invited by the Greens in Europarliament to Brussels to discuss the project "Investigating
Transboundary Pollutant Transportation in Baltic States: an Example of Integrated Assessment of the Environment and Predicting Possible Consequences of Extraordinary Natural and Man caused Situation in the North-West Region (Pskov, Novgorod, Leningrad, Kaliningrad) Russia and the Frontier Countries".
These were not “insinuations against the project and against the Mr. Tikhonov” which “might be more based on internal intrigues and academic and environmental micro cosmos in St. Petersburg than on other things”, as Mr. Frank Schwalba-Hoth writes in his return letter on February 4, 2005.
We only apply to our Western European colleagues to pay attention at dangerous political changes that happen in Russia and remind us events in Germany in the beginning of 1930s.

A wave of spy-mania has grown in Russia lately. A number of cases grow when scholars are
accused groundlessly of spying, disclosure of state secrets or illegal export of processing technologies.
More then 30 Russian NGOs made a special statement concerning such cases in January 2005.
And The Public Committee on Protection of Scholars was founded in Moscow.

Unfortunately, heads of some research institutions either are indifferent to persecution of their
workers by the Federal Security Service (FSB) or actively cooperate with FSB. In some cases
such positions of the heads helped FSB to fabricate cases when scholars were prosecuted and
got large terms of jail (cases of I. Sutiagin and V. Danilov who are imprisoned for 14 and 15 years correspondingly). On the one hand, such heads support secret services staying in Russia, and,
on the other hand, they speak about their adherence to democratic ideals when visiting Western countries and try to find their niches in international programs and projects.

Sending information on A. V. Tikhonov to the Greens in Europarliament, we only intended to pay attention of the deputies at an existence of such a problem and a necessity to be more careful choosing partners for cooperation in Russia. We do not have any doubt in high qualification and personal honesty of Mr. Frank Schwalba-Hoth who singed an invitation for A. V. Tikhonov to come to Brussels (look to the separate attach file). We just point out at a shortage of information on the contemporary Russian situation among Western public. And we had a goal to fill in this information gap.

Sincerely,

Oleg Bodrov, NGO Green World Chairman, member of International Socio-Ecological Union, Coalition Clean Baltic member, Sosnovy Bor – St. Petersburg, Russia, Phone/fax +7 81369 72991, mobile: +7 921 74 52 631,
e-mail: Bodrov@sbor.net , http://www.greenworld.org.ru/ , http://www.decomatom.org.ru/
Prof. Alexey Yablokov, President, Center for Russian Environmental Policy, Moscow, phone/fax: +7 095 9528019

Alexander Nikitin, NGO Bellona, Chairperson of the Russian office , St. Petersburg, Russia, phone/fax: +7 812 327 28 43

(a document, showing the invitation letter of Mr Schwalba-Hoth to Mr Tichonow has been attached to this message. It is available from Oleg Bodrov directly, or by request to post@infobalt.de)

One of the most engaged independent eco-groups in St.Petersburg - GREEN WORLD

independent environmental research in Russia - impossible?

Russian FSB influence to Scientists
Sosnovy Bor, St. Petersburg region, Russia
January 31, 2005

Open Letter

Dears ladies and gentlemen,

Discouraged information is got from Sociological Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg. The Director of the Institute (Alexander Tichonov)and his wife (Galina Tichonova) received an Invitation from the Green European Parliament to discuss a process of realization of the Project "Investigating Transboundary Pollutant Transportation in Baltic States: an Example of Integrated Assessment of the Environment and Predicting Possible Consequences of Extraordinary Natural and Man caused Situation in the North-West Regions (Pskov, Novgorod, Leningrad, Kaliningrad) Russia and the Frontier Countries". The Project has been functioning till 2007. The meeting will held in Brussel from January 23 till February 6, 2005. The invitation is signed by Frank Schwalba-Hoth. Five individuals are included to the Russian Group: I. Kulikov, P. Seleznev, M. Holmyaynsky, A. Tihonov, G.Tihonova. The backgrounds of the first three persons are uncertain. But it is well-known that A. Tihonov and G. Tihonova never study environmental problems. Moreover, G. Tihonova is an artist.
And one more important detail. The Director of Sociological Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences A. Tihonov closely cooperates with Russian Federal Service of Security (FSB). According to instructions from FSB during more than half an year he did his best to stop the only environmental research project in the Sociological Institute, concerning the closed nuclear cities (The head of the Project is Olga Tsepilova). He supported all initiatives of FSB against Olga Tsepilova. Despite his view, the most of the specialists at the Institute support Olga Tsepilova.
The Scientific Council of the Sociological Institute issued the decision to continue investigations in the closed nuclear cities in 2005.
More information in application (below) and at the Olga Tsepilova +7 911 7400 828.
Green World Chairman
Oleg Bodrov
Mobile phone: +7 921 74 52 631

BALTIC NEWSLETTER OF THE GREEN WORLD
January 13, 2005, ? 85
Information periodical of the environmental NGO GREEN WORLD, South Coast of the Gulf of Finland.
P.O Box 93/7, Sosnovy Bor188544, Leningrad Oblast,
tel/fax: (81369) 72991; ?-mail: bodrov@sbor.net, www.greenworld.org.ru
Russian federal security service blocks independent research
in the atomic neighborhoods of russia and accuses a researcher of spying

On December 22, 2004 a sociologist Olga Tsepilova from the St. Petersburg Sociological Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences (SI RAS) made the report for the Board of Inspectors under the Russian Commissioner for Human Rights (Vladimir Lukin). You can find the abridged version if her report below.
Olga Tsepilova, a senior researcher, Doctor of sociology, has told about the blockage of studies for possible solutions of socio-ecological problems typical of closed neighborhoods (official name ‘closed administrative territory units’ – ZATO) in Russia.
Local authorities and Russian citizens living on the territory of ZATOs have no alternative jobs, for this reason such locations are doomed to nuclear industry-related development. In such communities the mechanisms of market economy and democracy do not work, which produces a grave environmental, economic and social hazard for the society, because there is no civil control of the situation there.
This prohibition of sociological studies in the Ural Region can be considered as a precedent and repeated in Sosnovy Bor, where Olga Tsepilova was planning to conduct her research in 2005. These research plans have been approved by the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences in January 2003. In November 2004 the Scientific Council of the SI RAS confirmed that Sosnovy Bor would remain the main target territory of the academic studies of Olga Tsepilova in 2005.
The measures aimed at blocking public awareness about the social and environmental situation in Sosnovy Bor have already been taken:
In autumn of 2003 the regional ecological laboratory was closed. For 30 years the laboratory had been conducting environmental and radiological monitoring of the neighborhood of a nuclear complex located 80 km from St. Petersburg on the South coast of the Gulf of Finland Baltic Sea (Sosnovy Bor). This monitoring, independent from the nuclear industry, provided important data on the influence of hazardous facilities on the human health and environment. Now nuclear- and radiologically-hazardous companies control themselves.
In autumn 2004 a local newspaper VESTNIK LAES (Leningrad NPP Newsletter) was closed. The newspaper was used as a platform for discussing social and other problems of the nuclear complex. Igor Kiselev, former editor of the VESTNIK LAES, said in his letter sent to the GREEN WORLD: "Leningrad NPP is turning into the community closed for the free flow of information".
The restricted admission to Sosnovy Bor presents an obstacle for the development of non-nuclear business and possibilities for alternative jobs.
In this way the indirect, but effective promotion of nuclear development is carried out in absence of the efficient civil control of its safety.
In violation of the Russian legislation, without the state environmental examination and public participation hazardous atomic facilities poising a threat to the whole Baltic region have been put into operation. Local authorities and community living under the threat of direct influence from those hazardous facilities cannot influence the strategy for their development and check their safety level.
The sociological studies of closed communities belonging to Sosnovy Bor type can provide recommendations on ensuring socio-ecological safety in such neighborhoods for politicians and society.
Oleg Bodrov,
GREEN WORLD, Sosnovy Bor
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O. D. Tsepilova, Ph.D.
Sociological Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences
Russian Counterintelligence Stops Social Environmental Studies in Nuclear Cities. Sociologists Are Accused of Spying
As a worker of Academy of Sciences I have done social-environmental studies for more than twenty three years. My areas of specialization are social environmental movements, environmental conflicts in new investment policy, a formation and development of Russian environmental policy, and beginning from 2002 a social environmental context of nuclear cities' development.
All my previous professional experience determined my interests in the last area. On December 2002, the Research Council of the Sociological Institute included my project Contaminated Communities of Russia: Sociological Analysis of History and Social Consequences (A Case of Closed Administrative-Territorial Formation (CATF)) to a research plan of the Institute for 2003-2005. In January 2003, the Russian Academy of Sciences' Presidium also approved the project which received its own number of state registration (01.20.03 11411). Two cities were approved as objects of my study: CATF Ozersk in Cheliabinsk oblast' and Sosnovy Bor, a semi-closed city in Leningrad oblast'.
There were several reasons for choosing of Ozersk as the object of the study. Firstly, according to its social-demographic characteristics Ozersk is a typical Russian CATF. Secondly, Maiak, one of the most contaminated with nuclear waste enterprises that belongs to the Russian Nuclear Agency (the former Ministry on Nuclear Industry). Finally, three nuclear disasters happened at this enterprise in the past. The consequences of these disasters have influence the local population till now. The region continues to draw new environmental risks: the Russian Nuclear Agency hides the main proportion of Russian and foreign nuclear wastes at Maiak's territory; Maiak constructs the only in Russia and the largest in the World a depository of nuclear decaying materials; the Russian Nuclear Agency again discusses plans to construct the South-Uralic Nuclear Power Plant.
The Russian Academy of Sciences practically does not support financially empirical studies. That is why beginning from 2003 I tried to find a financial support for the empirical part of my study in Russian and foreign research and public foundations. A public social-environmental organization "Planet of Hopes" in Ozersk agreed to provide money for the study according to its project CATF of Russia: Civic Activity and Human Rights. The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) that legally works in Russia financially supported the project of Planet of Hopes.
I planned to conducted a representative survey in Ozersk (N = 600). The goals of the survey were to investigate the environmental, social-economic, cultural, and political attitudes among the respondents, to compare their environmental, economic, and social priorities; and to elucidate protest actions of the respondents produced by the poor environmental situation. Specifically, I wanted to find how the population saw the environmental situation in Ozersk, whether it was conscious of nuclear risks, how people estimated their health conditions, what they thought about necessity to live in a close community, whom they accused for nuclear disasters at Maiak in 1940s – 1960s, and so on. My colleagues and I intended to use the results of the study for preparation of scholastic reports and publications, as well as for a development of recommendations for an improvement of the local environmental policy. We planned not only to obtain research results, but also wanted to help the population of this territory.
On April 2004 ?. the second co-head of the study Aleksandr Duka and I got a permission to enter Osersk for a preliminary negotiation. After this negotiation we left a package of documents necessary for a permit of our research group to come to Ozersk in the Department on the Secret Regime of the City. All the documents included authentic information and corresponded to all requirements of the law.
We planned to leave for Ozersk on May 14, 2004. But On May 12 director of Maiak V. Sadovnikov forbade our group to come to Ozersk. Moreover members of Osersk municipal administration provoked me to write a letter in order to pass it non-formally to V. Sadovnikov to encourage him to cancel his decision and to save the study. I had only two hours from 7 to 9 in the morning on May 14 to prepare this letter and was not able to contact with the director of my institution. That is why I could not exclude some mistakes in the official registration of this new letter. Nobody passed the letter to V. Sadovnikov. Instead it went to officers of counterintelligence – Federal Service of Security (FSB) in Ozersk. In the future this became the only document that FSB used against me. Again I stress that the letter was not a document required by the Russian law in order to obtain a permit to come to the city and it was sent after a time limit which the law gives to Ozersk administration in order to answer requests like ours.
The study was disrupted. On May 20, 2004 I was invited to the district office of FSB. I showed officers of FSB my questionnaire, the other documents necessary for the study, and documents on my relations with "Planet of Hopes" and tried to discuss procedures of the study that could satisfy all the organizations in Ozersk. The officers declined my attempt. Moreover they told that it was likely that I would be accused in spying. They specially stressed that in fact a foreign foundation supported the project. I understood that their threats were very serious and applied for help to a social human right organization Bellona that asked their lawyer to provide me with legal help. In two months of an active defend (letters to FSB, complaints to a prosecutor's office, and so on) it looked that the story became to go out slowly. Nevertheless, in a half of year after the beginning of the case and in four months after its going out a newspaper Komsomol'skaia Pravda published a paper of Aleksei Sobolev with a sentence "Olga Tsepilova would receive money from CIA" printed with a large font. The paper also stated that it was a judicial investigation against me. It is interesting that the paper appeared simultaneously with a preliminary verdict against a physicist Valentin Danilov. And one detail more. A previous paper of Aleksei Sobolev published on July 2004 was also devoted to Danilov's case. Sobolev showed his dissatisfaction with an absolutory sentence of a jury. In the Soviet period a practice existed that newspapers would present such publications according to KGB requirements.
So, what is a result of active actions of FSB against the sociologists? The study was disrupted. An inspection of my business papers and financial documents does not show violations of laws. The FSB only produced unproved statements that O. Tsepilova "created causes and conditions that helped to substantialize threats for the Russian Federation's security (Statement of St. Petersburg and Leningrad oblast' Department of FSB, May 28, 2004), that Tsepilova was accused in «and attempt to collect data of unestablished character» (the same document) and a statement that Tsepilova had "relations with CIA"(Komsomol'skaia Pravda, November13, 2004). Thus, attempts to fabricate new "spy cases" become more provocative and more unproved. A search for enemies among scholars continues.
Unfortunately, the Russian society becomes more and more indifferent to the growing mania of spying. That is why I am especially grateful to my colleagues-sociologists and NGO’s such as Bellonar, Civic Control, Greenpeace of Russia, Center of Environmental Politics of Russia, Public Committee on Protection of Scholars, Institute for Development of Liberty of Information, "Planet of Hopes" (Ozersk), Cheliabinsk Regional Public Fund "Helping Hand", Human right group "Step Towards" (Snezhinsk), and "Green World" (Sosnovy Bor) for their moral support.
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The issue was prepared by
Oleg Bodrov, Olga Tsepilova, Tatiana Talalaeva.
The transfer of our information is encouraged.
When reprinting please refer to our periodical.
GREEN WORLD
Non-governmental non-profit environmental charitable organisation, member of the International Socio-Ecological Union, member of the Coalition Clean Baltic
Registered in the Justice department of Leningrad Oblast 31 January 1997, registration number 605,
P.O. Box 93/7, Sosnovy Bor 188544, Leningrad Oblast, t/f: (81269)72991; ?-mail: bodrov@sbor.net
www.greenworld.org.ru

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